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Abstract
We conduct a field experiment in 31 primary schools in England to test whether
temporary incentives are effective in increasing children’s choice and consumption of
fruit and vegetables. The intervention consists of rewarding children with stickers
and little gifts for a period of four weeks for choosing a portion of fruit or veg-
etables at lunch. We compare the effects of two incentive schemes (piece rate and
competition) on choice and consumption over the course of the intervention. We
also examine the effect of the interventions immediately after the incentives are re-
moved and six months later to see if the temporary incentives had any lasting effect
on dietary choices. We find that the two interventions, in general, had positive
effects on choice and consumption and that the competition works better overall.
However, we find that the treatment effects vary dramatically by age, gender and
socio-economic background. We find little evidence of sustained long term effects,
except for children from poorer socio-economic backgrounds.
JEL Classification: J13, I18, I28, H51, H52
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1. Introduction
Poor nutrition is a primary cause behind the recent surge in obesity which is not only
one of the leading causes of death but is also contributing to the rising cost of health care
in many developed countries1. According to the World Health Organization (2009) poor
nutrition is related to three of the five highest risks for morality in the world: high blood
pressure; high blood glucose; and overweight and obesity. In response, policy makers have
been pushing information interventions, such as ”5-a-day” campaigns, to encourage people
to develop better eating habits. However, the effectiveness of information only campaigns
have been questioned and policy makers are now considering if rewarding individuals for
eating healthier is a better approach2.
Despite the push by policy makers, it is actually an open question if rewarding indi-
viduals for eating healthier will work or play any long lasting role in solving the problems
caused by poor nutrition. Indeed some research shows that rewarding children for eat-
ing healthy items can lead to those items being less preferred3. Recent work by Just and
Price (2013) has shown that schools where short term rewards are given for eating healthy
items does lead to an increase in the proportion of children consuming a serving of fruits
or vegetables at lunch time. Two weeks after the incentive is removed, however, there is
no lasting change in the amount of fruits and vegetables consumed at the project schools.
The lack of longer term effects could be due to the intervention period being too short or
the incentives not being large enough.
Recent research in education (see Angrist and Lavy (2009), Angrist, Lang, and Ore-
opoulos (2009), Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton (2009) or Frey (2011)), smoking cessation
(see Volpp et. al (2009) and Gin et. al. (2011)), and exercise (see Charness and Gneezy
(2009) and Acland and Levy (2011)) has shown that incentives can induce individuals to
engage in positive behaviour. Furthermore, the research on exercise has even shown that
the habits developed during the incentive period can carry over to the post-intervention
period. However, as pointed out by Rabin (2011), we still know very little about which
health behaviours are really habitual, how important habits are and what type of incentive
schemes are most effective in changing those bad habits4. Given the potential for external
incentives to crowd out intrinsic motivation (see Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) for an ex-
1See Bhattacharya and Sood (2011) for an overview of the costs of obesity
2See Ciliska et al (2000) for a review of many community based interventions. Information
campaigns have some success in changing attitudes but have less success in changing actual be-
haviour, Robertson (2008) and Verplanken and Wood (2006). See the NICE citizens council report
(http://www.nice.org.uk/media/9AF/56/CCReportIncentives.pdf) for a review of the issues of the Na-
tional Health Service (NHS) using incentives to change health related behaviour.
3See Birch et. al. (1982), Birch et. al. (1984), and Newman and Taylor. (1992) for examples.
4See the recent discussion by Gneezy et al. (2011)
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ample) and the fact that health research has shown negative effects of rewarding healthy
eating, it is of utmost importance to examine the effects of incentivizing individuals to
choose healthy items; especially given the recent push by policy makers.
We are particularly interested in testing whether incentives work for sub-groups of the
population who have been shown to respond little or not at all to alternative interventions
(such as information campaigns). Specifically, one robust finding in the literature (Muller
et al. (2005), Perry et al (1998) and Kelder et al (1995)) is that interventions are much
less effective among boys than girls on the one hand, and among children from poorer
socio-economic status. This is of particular concern because these two sub-groups (boys
and children from poorer socio-economic status) are also those with the worse eating
habits and most at risk of developing nutrition-related diseases. One important question
is whether incentives can trigger responses from these sub-groups. The individual level
effects are of particular importance because, while, on average, the number of healthy
items consumed at an intervention school may increase, vulnerable groups may eat worse
due to the intervention. In terms of societal welfare, one may not want to implement a
policy if the increase in the proportion of healthy items consumed is driven by an increase
in consumption by those already eating healthily while those eating poorly decrease their
consumption.
Of course, one important question here is ”what kind of incentives?” There are many
ways one could incentivise and, as in the case of alternative policy interventions, differ-
ent incentive schemes may work better for some people than others. The question is
then: which incentives are most effective for which sub-groups of people? There is now
for example a well-established literature showing that boys tend to be more competitive
than girls (see Gneezy et. al. (2003) and Gneezy and Rustichini (2004)). The compe-
tition incentive has not yet been used in the exercise or health interventions looking at
incentivizing positive behaviour. Given the gender differences in eating behaviour and in
response to alternative interventions, we find it of particular interest to compare the ef-
fects of an individual-based scheme (piece-rate) and a competitive (tournament) incentive
in the context of eating.
Using two schemes also allows us to examine one aspect of why the individual-based
rewards in Just and Price (2013) may not have found effects beyond two weeks: does
competition or a group based award work better than an individual-based reward? Keep-
ing the intervention period constant, one could vary the incentive scheme and find longer
term effects.
As in the research on exercise and smoking cessation, besides changing choices during
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the intervention period, the short-term effects could lead to changes in longer term habits.
Indeed work on habit formation in exercise has shown that changes in behaviour remain
after the invention has been removed, though, it is unknown just how long these changes
last5. With regards to healthy eating there is evidence that habits form early on in life
and track into adulthood (see Kelder et. al. (1994); Resnicow et. al. (1998); and Singer
et. al. (1995)). Given this, we did not only monitor choices and consumption of students
during the intervention period but also in the week after the intervention stopped and
six months later. This allows us to see if any effects we observe during the intervention
period last into the future. Furthermore we followed students in year two (roughly six
years of age) and year five (roughly nine years of age) to examine age effects.
Therefore, considering the habit formation literature and the closely related topic of
incentivising positive behaviours, our paper has two major contributions: it examines
the heterogeneous effects of incentivizing students to adopt a positive behaviour; and it
examines how the type of incentive scheme matters during and after the treatment. We
are also able to examine why these different incentive schemes have different effects. We
examine how these contributions fit into the habit formation literature by looking at how
different subgroups respond both immediately after the incentive have been removed and
six months later using a field experiment involving 31 schools across England.
We find that incentivizing students to choose fruit or vegetables has an overall positive
effect on choice and consumption of fruit or vegetables at lunchtime in treated schools.
However, the overall effect masks significant differences by age; in the piece-rate scheme
year two students eat less when incentivized while there is a large positive effect for
year five students. Besides stark heterogeneous differences in the effect, there are some
differences by incentive type; overall the competition works better while the positive
effects of the piece-rate scheme disappear after two weeks. In particular, we find that
the piece-rate scheme has a discouragement effect caused by the threshold requirement
of having to eat four fruit or vegetables; students know when they missed the threshold
and then actively choose not to have fruit or vegetables during the remainder of the week.
This discouragement effect is not present in the competitive scheme where any number
of fruit or vegetables could, in principle, result in an additional reward. The differences
in the treatment effects also show up when the incentive scheme is removed: students
assigned to the competition treatment are more likely to continue eating healthily in the
week immediately following the treatment. Six months later we do find some positive
effects of the treatment for those that were affected during the incentive period.
5See Acland and Levy (2011) and Charness and Gneezy (2009) for examples.
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Our results are broadly consistent with both the economic literature on habit formation
and the health literature on how food preferences develop. Present-biased (hyperbolic)
preferences, such as those discussed in Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999),
can explain the persistence of bad habits despite an individual being fully aware of the
effects of poor nutrition. Individuals may over-weigh the initial costs of switching to
being a healthier eater or under-weigh the longer term benefits. Thus an intervention
providing an immediate benefit might be needed to get people to overcome the difference
in perceived costs and benefits. Likewise the health literature discusses how neophobia
(the predisposition to reject novel food) is non-monotonic with age and how children
may learn not to prefer a food if they are incentivized to eat it6. Neophobia should be
decreasing over the age of our sample meaning that the stark age effects - that year five
students respond more to both incentive schemes - are consistent with the literature.
The results presented in this paper are important for policy makers and health officials
trying to fight problems associated with poor nutrition. It shows that positive incentives
do work in encouraging healthy dietary choices and that the results of a short term
intervention can have long-lasting effects but that a ”one-size-fits-all” reward scheme
will not likely work. The heterogeneous effects suggest that health incentives need to
be evaluated at the individual level and, consequently, different policies may have to
be developed for different subgroups. Furthermore, increasing the length of time an
intervention is taking place is not the only way policy makers can increase the likelihood
that positive behaviours are adopted: for instance, competitions could have an effect when
individual-based schemes do not.
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present
the experimental design. In Section 3, we present a simple conceptual framework and
hypotheses that guide the analysis of the results. We present the results in Section 4 and
conclude in Section 5.
2. Experimental Design
We recruited schools in a three step process7. First we approached all 150 Local Education
Authorities (LEAs) in England to ask if they would be interested in participating; 22
6See Birch (1999) for a good summary of the development of food preference and neophobia. Birch
and Marlin (1982), Birch et. al. (1987, 1998), Sullivan and Birch (1990), and Cooke et. al. (2003) also
provide strong evidence about the role of overcoming neophobia through repeated exposure to a new food
or flavours.
7A companion paper, Belot and James (2013), documents the selection process of which schools choose
to participate in this experiment. In particular they find only mild selection suggesting that the schools
in the sample are representative of primary schools in England.
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responded positively. Second, we provided more information about the project to LEAs
that responded and set-up meetings with them to answer questions and discuss how to
recruit schools. We indicated to LEAs that we were interested in testing and comparing
the effectiveness of incentives schemes in increasing choice and consumption of fruit or
vegetables at lunchtime and that the interventions were specifically designed to target
students who were generally considered unresponsive to health interventions. After the
meetings 12 LEAs agreed to let us approach their schools and provided a list of at least
three schools that would consider being involved. Finally we approached all 46 schools
suggested by the LEAs; 31 of them agreed to participate.
We recruited students from year two (aged 6 and 7) and year five (aged 9 and 10) in
participating schools. Parents were provided with information about the project, asked
to fill out a questionnaire, and were required to give consent to have data collected about
their child. As agreed with the schools, all students in years two and five were included
in the project. However, data about choice and consumption of fruit or vegetables were
only recorded for children whose parents gave permission. Therefore, we have data on
626 students for the main part of the analysis.
Randomisation
We randomly allocated schools to one of three groups: control; competition; or piece-rate.
To make sure the groups were balanced we stratified our sample based on key observable
features. We were particularly careful to make sure that, ex ante, the average school in
each group had roughly the same number of students and looked the same in terms of
observable characteristics.
Schools were grouped by their local education authority (LEA) and, if there were at
least three schools in an LEA, one was randomly assigned to each of the three treatment
arms. When there were more than three schools, the others were randomly assigned to
treatment arms such that the overall sample was balanced based on observables. For the
purpose of balancing the three groups we used the following characteristics: (i) proportion
of female pupils; (ii) number of pupils; (iii) number of pupils in class groups (year 2
and year 5); (iv) proportion of students eligible for free school meals; (v) proportion of
students eating free school meals; (vi) per pupil expenditure; (vii) per pupil expenditure on
catering; (viii) percent of students achieving level 4 in both English and Mathematics; (ix)
average point scores of students on level 4 exams; (x) average percent of students absent
on a given day; (xi) percent of students absent from the level 4 exams; (xii) school type
(religious or comprehensive); (xiii) whether a school was involved in the ”Food for Life”
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Programme; (xiv) Ofsted School Categorization; and (xv) Ofsted Health Categorization
(OfHealth).
The variables listed above were used so that the average school in each treatment arm
was similar in ways that could have influenced whether the treatment scheme worked:
socio-economic background; school quality; student quality; and school type. Variables (i),
(ii), and (iii) relate to the demographic characteristics of the schools involved. Variables
(iv) and (v) relate to the economic background of the students. Variables (vi) and (vii)
relate to the financial expenditure at the school level. Variables (viii) - (xi) relate to the
quality of the student body at each school. Variable (xii) denotes if a school has a religious
affiliation. Variable (xiii) denotes whether the school voluntarily chose to be part of the
”Food for Life” programme which involves schools agree to teach students about healthy
eating8. Variable (xiii) is the overall classification of the school based on its Ofsted results:
1 = outstanding; 2 = good; 3 = requires improvement; and 4 = inadequate. Variable
(xiv) relates to the extent to which the pupils adopt a healthy lifestyle.
Using a random number generator, schools were assigned to one of the three treatment
arms based on the LEA restrictions9. We then checked to make sure the three treatment
arms were balanced based on all 15 observable characteristics. Indeed there were no ex
ante differences between the control, piece-rate, and competition groups based on the 15
variables listed above.
Treatments
In our experiment we decided to incentivise choosing fruit or vegetables instead of eating
fruit or vegetables. We did this for a few reasons. First, the health literature highlights
how making rewards contingent on consumption of a particular food can cause children
to have a lower preference for that item (see Birch et. al. (1982, 1984) and Newman and
Taylor (1992) for examples). We wanted to minimize the potential for negative effects on
healthy eating. Second, we wanted the experiment to be something that was relevant to
policy and simpler to implement. Rewarding for choice removes any subjective judgement
of the monitor to decide what constitutes an adequate amount of food consumed to be
rewarded. Furthermore, schools can require students to take a fruit or vegetable at lunch
but are unlikely to be able to force them to eat the item. Therefore the results of our
study are likely to be more relevant to policies that are being considered at the school
8See http://www.foodforlife.org.uk/ for further information about the programme.
9In schools with less than 75 pupils all students were invited to participate in the experiment, not just
those in years 2 and 5. This was taken into account when we checked if the three treatment arms were
balanced; especially with regards to variable (iii).
7
level now. Indeed the results of our study are especially relevant to determine if providing
(or requiring a student to take) a fruit or vegetable at lunchtime has any follow through
effect on consumption behaviour. Third, we also wanted the program to involve mini-
mal costs. Monitors were already people working in the school and with the students at
lunch time. While we could have considered a multi-component approach such as ”Food
Dudes,” combining such as aspects as bringing in role models, monitoring choices for each
type of fruit or vegetable chosen, etc. this would have required a larger investment of
resources and likely been too expensive for many schools to adopt10. Finally, rewarding
for choice rather than actually consuming an item negates the possibility of cheating. For
example, if rewards were based eating the pupil has an incentive to dispose of the fruit or
vegetable; the student may hide it, give it to a friend or try to mislead monitors regarding
actual consumption.
We examine the effect of providing incentives on choosing and eating fruit or veg-
etables using two different interventions: a piece-rate scheme and competitive scheme.
In both schemes the pupils were given a sticker for choosing or bringing in a fruit or
vegetable at lunch11. The piece-rate scheme was chosen because it is similar to many of
the other individual based incentive schemes used in the healthy eating and habit forma-
tion literature (for instance, see Charness and Gneezy (2009) or Just and Price (2013)).
The competition was chosen because the literature on gender and competition suggests
that boys respond more to competition than girls (see Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) and
Gneezy et. al. (2003)). Given that boys tend not to respond to traditional healthy eating
interventions, the competition was seen as an incentive scheme that could get boys to
respond. However, gender differences in competition can vary by task (see Iriberri and
Rey-Biel (2011)). Therefore if the task of choosing a healthily item is viewed as a ’favour-
ing females’ then even the competitive scheme might not get boys to choose or consume
fruit or vegetables.
In both schemes students received a sticker every day they choose or brought in a
fruit or vegetable at lunchtime. Then, at the end of the week (Friday afternoon), each
student had the opportunity to pick a larger prize depending on the incentive scheme
in which the student was enrolled. In the piece-rate scheme, if a student collected four
stickers in the week she or he was allowed to choose an additional reward such as an item
of stationery or a small toy from a reward box. If the student had three or less stickers,
10See Horne et. al. (1995, 1998)
11Examples of the stickers can be seen in the appendix. All students were given a list of fruits and
vegetables that would be rewarded if they were included in packed lunches; the list is included in appendix
B.
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though, the student could not pick an additional award and the stickers did not count
to earning the prize next week. In the competition, students were assigned to random
groups of four, and the student with the most stickers in each group was able to select an
additional reward from the reward box12. In the case of a tie all students with the highest
number of stickers in the group were eligible for an additional reward. The groups were
revealed at the end of the week so students would not engage in strategic behaviour, such
as make choices based on other group member’s actions or absenteeism. For example, if
a pupil was absent on Monday then the others in their group would know that that pupil
could only collect a maximum of four stickers. The groups were changed each week so the
children could not anticipate with whom they would be competing and unused stickers
did not carry over to the next week.
Timing
Before the interventions began a background survey was sent to the parents that cov-
ered information on age, gender, ethnicity, primary language, height, weight, and typical
dietary habits. Then, starting the second week of October in 2011, we monitored what
students ate at lunch in all 31 schools. Lunch monitors13 recorded if a student chose a
fruit or vegetable or brought a fruit or vegetable in with a packed lunch and if the student
consumed none, some or more than half the item. On Friday that week students took a
food knowledge test and a ”spot-the-difference” test14. The food knowledge test required
the student to identify seven pictures of different items (e.g. celery or snickers bar) and
mark if each item was healthy or not. The ”spot-the-difference” test was designed to test
a student’s concentration and required a student to compare two sets of 30 dice that were
arranged in a six-by-five square. There were five differences between the two sets of dice;
the student was asked to circle the five differences. Students had 10 minutes to complete
each test.
The students went on half-term break for one week after the baseline data was col-
lected. Upon returning to school the students were reminded of the project and students
were monitored for the next five weeks. At control schools, the lunch monitors continued
to monitor students in the same way they did during the week in October: they collected
data on whether a student choose or consumed a fruit or vegetable. At the competition
and piece-rate schools students were incentivized to choose a fruit or vegetable for a pe-
12See appendix for pictures of some of the rewards from which students were allowed to choose.
13Lunch monitors were dinner ladies who worked in the cafeteria or school assistants who were present
at lunch time and sat with the students as usual during the lunch period.
14Examples of both can be seen in appendix A.
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riod of four weeks15. Each day a student choose or brought in a fruit or vegetable with
a packed lunch16 the student received a sticker. Furthermore, as discussed above, at the
end of each week, students would get a large prize based on the type of incentive scheme
in which they were enrolled.
On the fourth Friday of the treatment, the students completed another food knowledge
and ”spot-the-difference” test and were reminded that it was the last day of incentives.
The following week, immediately after the treatment, the choices and consumption of
students were still monitored. This allows us to see if there was any effect on choice and
consumption after the incentives were removed. To examine the longer term effects we of
the incentives we also went back to schools six months later, in June 2012, and monitored
the choice and consumption of the same students. Unfortunately, the week we chose did
not work for all schools so only 21 of the original 31 schools participated in the six month
follow-up17.
3. Conceptual Framework & Hypotheses
The idea of using incentives to change dietary choices and potentially longer term habits
relies on three insights from the health literature: (1) tastes and preferences of children
can be changed by exposure to new foods; (2) children are relatively impatient and may
suffer from projection biases; and finally (3) current consumption has an effect on future
consumption (habit formation).
Both incentive schemes reward choice rather than consumption. This is because re-
warding consumption is very intensive in terms of monitoring and because we were con-
cerned that rewarding the consumption of a full portion of fruit and vegetables may work
adversely in the longer run, in light of the evidence in the nutrition literature. The ques-
tion is why do we expect consumption to change as a consequence? Children could just
take the sticker and not eat the food. For them not to do that, we must conjecture there
is a ”cost” associated with choosing food and leaving it on the plate. Obviously, the lunch
supervisors do encourage children to eat the food on their plate and thus, it is plausible
that wasting the food is associated with a ”moral cost” or stigma. Increased choice could
then be associated with increased consumption. But in addition, the incentive scheme
may exacerbate these costs because the child may feel guilty about wasting food after
15Just and Price (2013) incentivized students for a period of 2-3 weeks and found no longer run effects.
Therefore, we chose to incentivize students for a longer period of time; 1-2 weeks longer.
16With the questionnaire and again at the start of the five weeks of monitoring, the parents of all
students received lists of what items would count as healthy if they were included with packed lunches.
17Fortunately, we find no evidence of selective drop-out, i.e. the results using the data from the first 6
weeks do not change if we exclude the 10 schools for which we have no data in June.
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having received a reward. Moreover, comparing across schemes, the competitive scheme
may trigger even more of a moral obligation than the piece rate, since the winning child
effectively prevents other children to get the additional reward. Given this framework we
can set out the hypotheses that our experiment was designed to test. As in other work
on incentivizing positive behaviour, we expect that our experiment will have a positive
effect on choice and consumption of fruit or vegetables.
Hypothesis 1: Students will choose more fruit or vegetables when they are rewarded for
taking a fruit or vegetable at lunchtime.
By providing a reward for choosing a healthy option, the benefit of taking a fruit or
vegetable at lunchtime will have increased for each student. Therefore we would expect
that, while the incentive scheme is running, students are more likely to choose a fruit or
vegetable. This would be consistent with the work by Gneezy and Charness (2009) and
Just and Price (2013). Furthermore, the effect is likely to differ by subgroups. Gender
differences exist in regards to consumption of fruit or vegetables (see Muller et al. (2005),
Perry et al (1998) and Kelder et al (1995)) and students from poorer families may value
the prizes more. The health literature highlights ages effects with regards to food pref-
erences and tastes (see Birch (1999) and the references therein); suggesting that there
is likely to be differences in the effect of the incentive by age. Furthermore, students
who eat packed lunches are particularly likely to be affected by the incentives because
recent surveys have found that 99% of packed lunches failed to meet the government set
nutritional standards (see Evans et. al. (2010) for more details); in the baseline, 28% of
our students brought in a packed lunch every day and 41
Students will consume more fruit or vegetables when they are rewarded for taking a fruit
or vegetable at lunchtime.
The behavioural literature has shown us that the default option can affect choice made
by individuals (see Keller et. al. (2011), Choi et. al. (2003), and Johnson and Goldstein
(2003) for examples) and even help reduce calorie consumption (Wisdom et. al. (2010)).
As a result health initiatives at schools have started to require students to have a fruit
or vegetable on their plate18. By incentivizing students to take a fruit or vegetable our
experiment is likely to have a follow-through effect on consumption. Furthermore, unlike
previous studies, our students have no incentive to lie or cheat regarding the amount of
the fruit or vegetable they consumed; the rewards are only based on choice. This means
18See Dillon and Lane (1989) for an evaluation of the differences between offering and serving a fruit
or vegetable and Just and Price (2013a) for the effect of requiring schools to serve healthy items.
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that we can estimate the causal effect of how an increase in having a fruit or vegetable
on one’s lunch tray effects consumption. As with choice, there is reason to expect that
the effect on consumption will vary with gender, age, and socio-economic background.
Therefore we will pay particular attention to subgroup effects.
Hypothesis 3: Students will choose and consume more fruit or vegetables after the in-
centive is removed than before.
Given how food preferences develop, if students have been eating more fruit or vegetables
during the intervention period they may have developed a preference for fruit or vegeta-
bles or developed a habit of eating fruit or vegetables at lunch time. Becker and Murphy
(1988) and Becker (1992) develop a model of habit formation where the marginal util-
ity of today’s consumption is correlated with historical consumption. Therefore a small
change in today’s behaviour - caused by an exogenous increase in the benefit of consuming
a fruit or vegetable for instance - could lead to long term changes in consumption. To
measure this we look at the proportion of fruit or vegetables a student chooses in the
week immediately following the intervention and six months later.
4. Results
4.1 Randomisation and pre-intervention summary statistics
We begin by comparing our treatment and control schools in the baseline period. Ta-
ble 1 presents the means of the outcome variables and other covariates by control and
treatment groups. The final two columns show the p-values for treatment and control dif-
ferences. There are no statistically significant differences for the overall sample suggesting
that, based on observables, the randomization worked as expected. Furthermore, even
though they are insignificant, the size of the differences (in most cases) is less than one
standard deviation, suggesting that the control and treatment groups are close to being
observationally equivalent in the baseline.
The lower part of the table shows the summary statistics for the sample of pupils who
chose, and consumed less than 100% in the baseline week for the dependent variables. This
group is of particular interest because these are the children who had room to improve
their behaviour, as opposed to those who already chose and ate a fruit or vegetable every
day. Again we find no significant differences. For the background variables we present for
the group who choose less than 100% of time a fruit or vegetable in the baseline period19.
19Summary statistics for the background variables for the less than 100% tried and eat more than half
in Table B1.
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Here, we only find a difference between the control and competition schools for those who
report having a special dietary requirement.
4.2 Descriptive Figures
We start with presenting three simple graphs, showing how our three main variables of
interest changed over time on average. We will examine one main variable for choice, which
we will label as ”choice,” and it will equal one if a student choose a fruit or vegetable on
a given day. For consumption we will focus on two variables: ”try” which will equal one
if the student eats at least some of the fruit or vegetable she choose that day; and ”eat
more” which will equal one if the student eats more than half of the fruit or vegetable
she chose that day. For the initial part of the analysis, we will look at the weekly mean
outcome for a given pupil since the largest prize in each incentive scheme is based on
weekly consumption. Specifically, we construct the following variables:
Mean(Outcome)isz =
∑5
day=1Outcomei,s,z,day∑5
day=1 Presenti,s,z,day
Where Outcomei,s,z,day is the outcome of interest for pupil i in school s in week z on a
specific day of the week. Present indicates whether the child was present at lunch or not
(this allows us to take account of possible absences).
Figures 1, 2 and 3 show how the three variables of interest changed over time20. Figure
1 shows the trend in ’choice’ for the control, piece-rate, and competition schools. We see
that the percentage of healthy choices is consistently higher in both types of treatment
schools than in the control schools during the interventions. However, the differences
disappear immediately after the incentive is removed (week six) and six months later, we
even observe a relative decrease in the competition schools. Figure 2, which shows the
trends for ’try,’ shows a much larger effect of the treatment schemes and a distinct pattern
in piece-rate schools. There is a sharp increase in week two, both in the competition and
piece rate treatments. But while this increase is sustained for the remaining weeks in
the competition schools, it reverses slightly in the piece rate schools after two weeks.
Six months later, we find higher rates of trying in the competition schools, followed by
the piece rate schools and finally the control schools. Figure 3, which is for ’eat more’
shows roughly the same pattern as Figure 2: there is a sharp increase in week two,
20In the piece rate scheme an interesting threshold to keep in mind is 80% which corresponds to the
threshold to pass to receive an additional reward at the end of the week.
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which is sustained over the period of the intervention, in week six (immediately after the
intervention) and six months later. We also note an increase in the control schools six
months later; this could be due to a seasonal effect or other interventions that have taken
place in the schools.
4.3 Short term effects (during the intervention)
Average treatment effects on the main outcome variables
We begin by reporting the average treatment effects for the three main outcome variables
of interest: ’choice,’ ’try,’ and ’eat more’. The treatment lasted for 4 weeks. Therefore,
in the first instance, we present the results separately for each treatment by week. This
allows us to see if and how the intervention may vary over the intervention period; students
may become tired of the prizes and stop responding after the first few weeks.
We estimate the following linear probability model:
Mean(Outcome)isz = β0 +
5∑
z=2
βzWeekz + βcompComps + βpiecePieceRates
+
5∑
z=2
βz,compComps ×Weekz +
5∑
z=2
βz,piecePieceRates ×Weekz + αi + uist
Where outcomeist is the outcome of interest for pupil i in school s in week z, Week 2,5
are week dummy variables, Comp and PieceRate are dummy variables indicating whether
school s is part of the competition or treatment group, and the unobserved error term is
αi + uist. The parameters to be estimated are β0, βz,comp, βpiece, and βz, βz,Comp, βz,piece
(for z=1,5).
Since our dependent variables are bounded upwards (at 1), we estimate this specifi-
cation on the whole sample and on the sample of students most likely to respond: those
who did not have a mean outcome equal to one in the baseline (referred to later as ”Less
than 100%”). We are particularly interested in the latter group because those who are
not choosing or consuming a fruit or vegetable every day is the subgroup that could most
benefit from the intervention - they could be encouraged to eat healthier - whereas the
group that choose and consumed a fruit or vegetable every day is already eating as healthy
as possible in our framework.
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The results are presented in Table 2. In the sample of all pupils, there was little effect
of the piece rate scheme on all three outcomes of interest but there was a positive effect
in the competitive scheme. Column [1] shows that competition increases the probability
that a student choose a fruit or vegetable by 5.9 percentage points in the first week of
the intervention. Thereafter the difference-in difference estimates are positive but no
longer significant. There are no significant effects for the piece-rate scheme in column [1].
Column [2] we can see a similar but clearer pattern ’try:’ there is an 8.5 percentage point
increase in the probability of a student trying a fruit or vegetable in the first week of the
intervention; a 9.5 percentage point increase in the second week of the intervention; and
a 7.5 percentage point increase in the third week of the intervention. Likewise there is no
significant effect for the piece-rate scheme, though, the point estimates are large in the
first two weeks of the intervention. Column [3] shows the effect on ’eat more:’ there are
no significant differences, although the coefficients are all positive and of the same order
of magnitude as those in column [2].
The picture looks slightly different in columns [4]-[6] when we consider the restricted
sample, i.e. those who did not choose or consume a fruit or vegetable every day during
the baseline and, thus, there was room for them to improve their nutritional habits.
Roughly we see the same picture for each outcome variable of interest; the competitive
scheme has a large significant effect that does not dissipate over the intervention period
where as the piece-rate scheme has an initial positive effect in the first two weeks of the
intervention and then drops off over the rest of the intervention period. By the last week
of the intervention, the percentage of healthy choices increased by 17 percentage points,
the percentage of portions tried increased by 18 percentage points and the percentage of
portions eaten for more than half increased by 15 percentage points in the competitive
scheme but there were no significant results for the piece-rate scheme. This means that
the competitive scheme, on average, caused students to choose, try, and eat more than
half of one additional fruit or vegetable per week.
These first results highlight the importance of testing different mechanisms and schemes
while using incentives which a simple piece-rate scheme alone, as used in most other stud-
ies, could have missed.
Choice and consumption dynamics
Having established that there are differences in the effectiveness of the incentive schemes
we now move onto explain why it might be the case the competitive scheme appears to
work better in comparison to piece-rate scheme. While the previous analysis was based on
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week level regression we do have data at the day level for each student. In this section we
will analyse the student-day level data and examine the dynamics of choice and consump-
tion throughout the week. In particular we will look at if there are different dynamics
based on the two types of treatments.
First when looking at choice, the students who were most responsive to the treatments
were those who had not chosen a fruit or vegetable 100% of the time during the baseline
period. Column [1] in panel A of table 3 shows the day level regressions for that sample
of students21. As in the weekly regressions, column [1] shows that competition had a
large and significant effect on choice during treatment weeks; students assigned to the
competition group were 16 percentage points more likely to choose a fruit or vegetable.
There was a large imprecisely estimated effect due to piece-rate22. Columns [2]-[6] show
the effect of the treatments for each day of the week. The effect of the competitive scheme
started off very strong at the beginning of the week; on Mondays and Tuesdays students
were 20 and 24 percentage points, respectively, more likely to choose a fruit or vegetable.
As the week went on the effect dissipated, though; the point estimate decreased from 18
percentage points on Wednesday to 4 percentage points on Friday. Piece-rate had the
opposite effect; students were more likely to choose their fruit or vegetable at the end of
the week. The only significant increase in choice due to the piece-rate treatment took
place on Friday when students were 25 percentage points more likely to choose a fruit or
vegetable.
In the competitive scheme students did not know how many fruit or vegetables they
would have to choose to get a prize at the end of the week; if they choose five fruit or
vegetables, though, they were guaranteed a prize. Since students did not know who was
in their group and some students did not choose a fruit or vegetable every day, a student
could assign a subjective probability to winning given how many items she had chosen
during the week23. Based on a student’s subjective probability one could calculate the
number of fruit or vegetables that a student would ideally want to consume each week to
maximize her benefit from getting a prize subject to her disutility from having to choose
21There was no effect - either positive or negative - on the sample of students that had chosen a healthy
item 100% of the time during the baseline week. The effect on all students is just a weighted average of
these two groups.
22Redoing the weekly tables in the results section using day level data does not yield any qualitatively
different results. The imprecision of the piece-rate estimate is primarily driven by the fact that year 5
students responded positively while year 2 students responded negatively; this will be discussed later
when the heterogeneity of the effects are discussed.
23In fact there was an increasing probability of winning the prize based on the number of healthy items
one chose. There was a small probability (under 5%) chance of winning if a student had chosen zero or
one item, a 6.7% chance of winning if a student chose two items, a 21% chance of winning if a student
chose three items, and a 39% chance of winning if a student chose 4 items.
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a fruit or vegetable. Once a student has reached that number of fruit or vegetables she
could switch back to her preferred unhealthy item. This type of pattern would explain
why the effect of competition tapered off during the week.
In the piece-rate scheme the threshold to obtain the weekly prize was known and
fixed. Given the exogenous pre-determined goal a student had to reach there was room
for discouragement to take place; if a student had not eaten a fruit or vegetable on
Monday or Tuesday then there was zero probability the student would get a prize that
week. Besides having no external incentive from Wednesday onwards, a student might
also feel discouraged and choose not to select a healthy option. Therefore, to examine
this discouragement effect we break the sample into two groups in columns [7] and [8].
Column [7] contains students who had ’missed’ the prize as of Wednesday, i.e. they had
not chosen a fruit or vegetable on Monday or Tuesday. Column [8] contains those students
who had chosen at least one fruit or vegetable before Wednesday. The effect of piece-rate
is large and significant for those who still have a chance of getting a prize, i.e. those in
column [8]. However, for those that have missed the chance of getting a prize the effect of
piece-rate is estimated to be negative, though, it is insignificant. This means that as the
week goes on the incentive to choose a fruit or vegetable wears off for those that miss the
goal in the piece-rate scheme. However, this is not the case in the competition treatment
because there is always a positive probability of winning the prize no matter how many
items the student has consumed during the week24.
These results speak to the intrinsic incentive differences between the two treatments.
The external, known goal in the piece-rate can lead to a lack of incentive because of
previous choice patterns. However, there is always a positive chance of winning in the
competition treatment because the goal is unknown and endogenous to the system. In the
habit formation literature with regards to healthy eating the goals have all been exogenous
and known. Therefore, there is room to design rewards like the competitive scheme that
can have a greater effect (than piece-rate) over the same period of time.
Panel B shows the effect of the treatment on consuming at least some of a chosen fruit
or vegetable on any given day. Column [1] of panel B shows the same effect as the weekly
results; competition has a large significant and positive effect and piece-rate has a positive
effect, though, it is insignificant and less precisely estimated. Columns [2]-[6] show the
daily effects and, as with choice, piece-rate only has an effect one day a week, in this case
on Thursday. More importantly, columns [7] and [8] show the differential effect of piece
24Indeed the point estimate for competition is the same in columns [7] and [8] showing that the choice
pattern before Wednesday does not change the effect that the competition treatment has from Wednesday
onwards.
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rate for those who have made different choices previously in the week. There is no effect of
the treatment for students that have missed the chance to get a prize by Wednesday, i.e.
those that have not chosen a fruit or vegetable on Monday or Tuesday; shown in column
[7]. There is a large and positive effect of piece-rate for those that still have a chance of
getting the prize, i.e. those that have chosen at least one fruit or vegetable on Monday or
Tuesday; shown in column [8]. The dynamics around trying a fruit or vegetable are the
same as choice for the piece-rate treatment.
The effect of the competitive scheme on consuming at least part of a fruit or veg-
etable is somewhat different than in choice. Columns [2]-[6] show a large positive effect
of competition that does not dissipate over the week. Students were not incentivized to
try the items therefore these results speak more to how a student behaves once a fruit or
vegetable is on her plate. Since students were choosing, on average, less fruit or vegetables
as the week went on, then this constant effect suggests that those who were choosing fruit
or vegetables on Monday were less likely to consume them, while those choosing them on
Wednesday were more likely to try them. On Friday, there was no effect of competition
on choice; therefore, the large effect seen in panel B has to mean that those who did
choose a fruit or vegetable definitely tried it. Friday is typically ”fish and chips” day at
many schools in the UK; for a student to give up chips she probably has to really like
the healthy option. The main effects on try, though, are those shown in columns [7] and
[8]. Again, the point estimate for competition does not vary between columns [7] and [8].
This means that previous choice patterns in the week do not effect consumption choices
later in the week systematically, unlike for the piece-rate treatment.
Heterogeneity in treatment effects
We now turn to the heterogeneity in treatment effects. We will focus on looking at the
effect of the two incentive schemes by gender, year-group, and free-school meal status.
Tables 4A and 4B report the estimates broken down by gender. With boys, shown in
Table 4A, we find significant short run effects of the piece rate only when we consider the
whole sample. But if we look at the more restricted sample, we find large and sustained
effects of the competition on choosing and trying in particular and also on ’eat more.’ As
in the overall sample, boys initially respond to the piece rate scheme but the effects start
to dissipate after the second week of the intervention. With girls, though, as shown in
Table 5B we find a striking pattern: whether we consider the whole sample or not, we
find that girls respond significantly to competition particularly in terms of trying a fruit
or vegetable, but we find no significant effects of the piece rate, not even at the beginning
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of the intervention period.
Tables 5A and 5B show the effects for year two and year five students respectively.
The two groups respond quite differently to the treatments. Year two students appear
to respond adversely to the piece rate, while we find very large and significant effects for
students in year five. In the whole sample, columns [1]-[3], we find that the percentage
of portions chosen and the percentage of portions tried are estimated to have decreased
to some extent for year two, although the effects are only significant for week 4. In the
restricted sample, columns [4]-[6], there is also a significant decrease for the piece-rate in
week two, the first week of the intervention, for trying a healthy time. Overall - in both
the restricted and entire sample - there is a small positive effect of the competition for
students in year two, though. However, when looking at year five students the results
are strikingly different: the piece-rate scheme increased by between 14 and 17 percentage
points for choosing, 22 and 25 percentage points for trying, and 22 and 26 percentage
points for eating more than half. Furthermore, with the year five students, the effect of
the piece-rate does not decrease over the incentive period. When looking at the restricted
sample in columns [4]-[6] the point estimates for piece-rate are even larger and significant
over the entire intervention period. However the restricted sample does show that the
competitive scheme also has a large significant effect that is similar in size and magnitude
as that shown for the complete restricted sample in Table 2.
Next we examine the effect by two other sub-groups, those who are eligible for a free
school meal (FSM) or not. The results for non-FSM students are reported in Table 6A
and the results for FSM students are reported in 6B. Children eligible to receive free
school meals at school usually come from lower socio-economic backgrounds. Children
from lower-socioeconomic background have been shown to be much less responsive to
interventions at aimed at tackling obesity and overweight (see for example Muller et al,
2005). For both of these groups it appears that the piece-rate scheme only had little or
no significant effect on whether a student chose or consumed a fruit or vegetable during
the intervention period. However, we find large and significant effects of the competitive
scheme for both the FSM and non-FSM students on the probability of trying a fruit or
vegetable. When looking at the restricted sample, we find that the likelihood that a
student tried a healthy time increased by nearly 20 percentage points in the first week of
the intervention both the FSM and non-FSM groups. Furthermore, the large significant
effect of the competition do not disappear over time for either the FSM or non-FSM
group.
The examination of the heterogeneity of the treatment effects provides key insights to
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how average effects can mask potential downsides that are of particular importance when
considering policy. With regards to the competition, it is clear that the overall effect
is large and significant: the competition caused students to choose and consume more
fruit and vegetables and those effects do not vary much by subgroup. However, looking
at the average effect of the piece-rate, would mask extreme differences in the response
by year groups. Table 2 suggests that the piece-rate had an initial effect on choice and
consumption but that the positive effect dissipated after two weeks. This general pattern
is only present for boys (table 4A) and non-FSM students (table 6A); girls (table 4B)
and FSM students (table 6B) did not have a significant response to piece-rate. However,
year five students did respond positively and the effect did not dissipate over time and
year two students responded negatively to the piece-rate. Given that piece-rate seems
to be effected by discouragement, these heterogeneous effects could be due to differential
responses to discouragement. Furthermore, if healthy eating habits developed at a young
age are more likely to last, then it is uncertain that a policy maker would want to introduce
an individual based scheme such as the piece-rate scheme used here since it appears to
discourage younger students from choosing and eating fruit or vegetables.
4.4 Medium term effects
We now turn to the post-intervention weeks and evaluate whether the changes observed
during the intervention persist in the week after the incentives are removed. The results
are presented in Tables 7, 8 and 9. Given that tables 3-7 allow us to see how the incentives
vary over the intervention period, we now look at the overall effect of the intervention
period in one summary variable, called ”wk 2-5.” However, our main coefficient of interest
is the interaction of the incentive scheme with week six, which is the week immediately
following the intervention.
Table 8 shows the effects by gender. As expected there is no discernible effect of the
treatment on the whole sample. Instead we see a strong positive effect on those most
likely to have responded, the restricted sample in columns [4]-[6]. With regards to the
competition, there is an average increase of 18.5 percentage points in the probability of
choosing a fruit or vegetable for boys, as shown in column [4]. In column [5] we see that
there is a 15.4 percentage point increase in the probability of trying a fruit or vegetable.
Column [6] shows no effect on eating more than half. When the incentive is removed
in week six, boys are more likely to continue eating part of the fruit or vegetables on
their plate. However, there is no other effect. With regards to piece-rate, boys respond
positively for all three outcomes of interest but there is not carry over into week six. When
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looking at girls, Table 8 panel B, we see that for the restricted sample, the significant
results from the incentive period are for the competition on consuming (try and eat more
than half) of a fruit or vegetable. In both of those cases, we also find lasting positive
effects after the incentives have been removed. These results suggest that when girls
respond to a treatment it is more likely to have at least a medium-run effect than when
a boy responds to a treatment.
Table 8 shows the effects by year group. The piece rate has a strong negative effect
on choosing, trying, and eating more than half of a fruit or vegetable for students in
year two. The negative effects persist even when the incentives are removed; all the
point estimates for week six interacted with piece-rate in columns [1]-[6] are negative and
significant. When looking at year five in panel B, we find very large and significant effects
of the piece rate and most of them are sustained once the incentive is removed. We find
a slightly different pattern for the competition. The competition, in general, effects both
year groups positively, however the positive effect on choice and consumption only carries
over into week six for the year two group - refer to column [2], [3], [5], and [6]. However,
in no case do the positive effects of the incentive period carry over into week six for the
year five group. This shows that when younger students respond to the incentive, even
if it is negative, it is more likely to persist than when the older students respond to the
incentives.
Finally, in Table 9, we split the sample by free school meal eligibility. Here again, we
mainly find significant effects for the competitive scheme and these effects are particularly
pronounced for FSM children. For non-FSM students we see that in the restricted sam-
ple there is a positive effect of the competition, columns [4]-[6] in panel A. The positive
behaviour only carries over into week six, when the incentives were removed, for consump-
tion of fruit or vegetables. For FSM students, we see a positive effect of competition in
columns [2]-[6]. In all of the consumption estimations, the positive effects carry over into
week six, refer to columns [2], [3], [5], and [6] in panel B. There is no effect of piece-rate
for either group.
As in the previous results we see that, in general, the competitive scheme works better
than piece-rate. Indeed there are more lasting effects after the competition incentives are
removed. However, of particular interest, is that the effects on consumption - trying and
eating more than half - are more likely to persist than the effects on choice. Given that
students are not more likely to choose a fruit or vegetable after the incentive is removed
but are more likely to consume a fruit or vegetable, which implies that the intervention
schemes have caused people who originally had fruit or vegetables as part of their meal
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to consume them rather than leave them on their plate. Given that people are now more
likely to consume fruit or vegetables when they are given them, that could imply that a
change in food preferences has occurred.
4.5 Habit Formation
To evaluate whether the effects we find lead to permanent changes in habits, we contacted
the schools again 6 months later and asked them to conduct an additional week of moni-
toring. Given that the medium run effects suggest that our intervention was more likely
to have an effect on consumption, we will focus our analysis here on the consumption
variables (”try” and ”eat more than half”). To evaluate whether a habit has formed, we
run a two-stage least squares regression, using the treatment dummies as instruments for
the mean consumption during the intervention (that correspond to the mean of ”try” or
mean of ”eat more than half” over the four weeks of intervention). Then, in the second
stage, we regress the consumption variables (”try” or ”eat more than half”) corresponding
to each of the post-intervention weeks (immediately after the intervention (week 6) and
6 months later) on the instrumented mean consumption during the intervention.
The results are presented in Table 10. We begin by presenting the estimates for all
pupils. The first stage results show a positive and significant effect of the two treatment
dummies on the proportion of fruit or vegetables tried during the intervention period for
week 6 and on the sample where who tried less than 100% in the first week. The first
stage estimates for 6 months later are typically weaker and are below 10. This is the case
for all of our remaining first stage estimates except the year 5 group. To address this we
have also estimated these results using limited information maximum likelihood (LIML)
which is less biased when weak instruments are used. In most cases the results do not
change25. We find a positive and significant effect of eating fruit and vegetables in the
intervention period on consumption in week 6, and therefore evidence of habit formation
in the immediate period after the intervention, for all pupils and those who tried less
than 100% in the first week. However, we do not find any evidence of habit formation
when we examine consumption 6 months later. When examining various subgroups we
find evidence of habit formation in week 6 for most groups. However, as with the entire
sample we do not find any evidence of long run habit formation on trying.
Considering the outcome of eating more than half we find evidence of short run habit
formation across our different groups, with LIML giving similar point estimates to 2SLS.
25There are two exceptions; when we run the estimation for the FSM children and boys in week 6 for
the whole sample using LIML the estimates are of a similar magnitude but are less precisely estimated.
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For the longer term we find that the free school meals pupils in the less than 100% group
in the first week developed a long run habit.
These results must be interpreted with caution. First, this is due to the small sample
sizes of some of the groups. Second, as can be seen in Figure 2 and 3 the proportion
consuming fruit and vegetables remains at a similar level as it was during the treated
period for the two treated groups. Therefore there is not a decay in the proportion
consuming. However, there was an increase in consumption by the control group. Given
the length of time between the end of the experiment period and the follow up we did not
restrict what the schools could do and it is plausible that they implemented an intervention
or policies to improve fruit and vegetable consumption.
4.6 Learning: Food Knowledge
One question is whether the intervention triggered a response only through the incentives,
or also through learning. It could be that the intervention taught children that fruit
and vegetables are healthy and that they respond to that information rather than the
incentives. We are able to test for this possibility by comparing the results on a knowledge
test that was conducted just before and at the end of the intervention. The test shows
pictures of 7 food items, including 3 or 4 fruit or vegetables and unhealthy items (such as
sweets, chips, ice cream, crisps, fish fingers). Children were asked to write what the item
is and whether the item was healthy or not (see Figure A2 for an example).
On average, we find that children described 92% items correctly and identified 83%
of healthy items correctly before the intervention (see Table B2 for summary statistics).
After the intervention, we find that results remained very similar (92% and 85% respec-
tively). We estimate a simple linear model with the second test score results as dependent
variable and include dummies for the experimental group of the school to which the child
belongs (piece rate, competition or control). We also control for the first test score results.
The results are presented in panel A of Table 11 for the sample of children who tried less
than 100% in the first week (panel A of Table B4 presents the results for the whole sam-
ple which are very similar). We find very little difference in the second test score results
across treatment and control groups. These results indicate that knowledge was very high
before the intervention and was not affected by the intervention. Children are very well
informed that fruit and vegetables are healthy and the responses to the intervention are
not driven by learning.
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4.7 Effects on cognitive outcomes
We now turn to the effects on cognitive outcomes. Cognitive ability is difficult to measure
with a single test. Also, the intervention we consider is mild (it only targets one portion
of fruit and vegetables a day). This is not a major shift in diet and, therefore, it is a
tough test to evaluate the effects of nutrition on cognitive ability. We chose to use a
partial measure of ability, capturing the ability to concentrate. Our conjecture is that
concentration may be the dimension of ability that responds most quickly to changes
in diet. These tests were given right after lunch on a Friday, both before and after the
intervention.
The test is based on the well-known ”spot-the-differences” puzzles (see Figure A3 for
an example). Each puzzle consisted of two sets of 5 by 6 domino squares. There were five
differences between each of the large squares that the pupils were required to find. They
were given ten minutes to solve as many as they could up to a maximum of fourteen.
Table B3 presents summary statistics on the test score results. We report the fraction
of completed puzzles (i.e. where 5 differences were correctly identified with a circle).
On average pupils solve 40% of the puzzles correctly. There is no gender difference and
no difference according to free school meal status, but Year 5 children perform better
on average than Year 2 children, as we would expect. The score of the second test is
also higher on average than the first test. The important question here is whether this
improvement is more pronounced in the treatment schools than in the control schools.
We estimate a linear model with the fraction of correctly solved puzzles as dependent
variable (see panel B of Table 11) and include treatment dummies, as well as the score
of the first test. We find a positive effect (significant at the 10% level) of the piece
rate on the restricted sample but we find no effects on average on the whole sample
(panel B Table B4). On the other hand, if we look at the sub-groups, we find a negative
effect on boys in the competition schools (again, not precisely estimated). Thus, these
results do not provide convincing evidence that the intervention lead to an improvement
in concentration. Of course, we should take these results with caution as we only consider
a mild intervention in diet and a very partial measure of cognitive ability.
5. Conclusion
This paper provides field evidence on the effects of incentives on the formation of new
dietary habits among children. We conducted a large scale field experiment in 31 primary
schools in the UK testing for the effects of two different incentive schemes: a competition
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and a piece rate scheme. Both schemes are targeted at children’s choice of fruit and
vegetables at lunch. We implemented the rewarding schemes for a period of 4 weeks and
monitored their choice and consumption over that period, as well as one week before, one
week after and 6 months later.
We find two main results. First, competitive and piece rate incentives have very
heterogeneous effects, particularly according to age. Younger children are more responsive
to competition; older children are more responsive to piece rate incentives. Piece rate
incentives work adversely on younger children (confirming some of the evidence in the
literature on child nutrition). Overall, competitive incentives are more effective. This
is because the piece-rate scheme contains a threshold which can create discouragement.
This discouragement is not apparent in the competition scheme where the pupils, in
principle, could receive an additional reward no matter how many items they had chosen.
The competitive mechanism also seems to work particularly well to encourage tasting
and trying fruit and vegetables among children from poorer socio-economic backgrounds.
Second, we do find evidence that the intervention continues to affect behaviour after
the incentives are removed. But we find that over the longer run (six months after
the intervention) the changes are not sustained. One important exception relates to
the children from poorer socio-economic backgrounds, for which we do find long term
sustained effects. This is a notable finding given the lack of response of this group in
many other school based health interventions. Finally, we do not find clear evidence of
effects of the intervention on a measure of cognitive ability.
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Figure 1: Average percentage of ”healthy choice” (all sample)
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Figure 2: Average percentage of ”try” (all sample)
Figure 3: Average percentage of ”eat more than half” (all sample)
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Table 1: Summary statistics Control and Treatment groups
Control Piece Rate Comp p-value p-value
(C) (T1) (T2) C vs T1 C vs T2
Choice 0.851 0.843 0.829 0.910 0.706
Ate something 0.736 0.756 0.768 0.789 0.634
Ate more than half 0.54 0.618 0.65 0.295 0.281
School Dinner 0.507 0.448 0.468 0.571 0.684
Packed Lunch 0.471 0.529 0.501 0.579 0.760
Female 0.524 0.448 0.549 0.180 0.628
1st Language English 0.978 0.982 0.929 0.853 0.203
Free School Meal 0.205 0.198 0.156 0.899 0.409
School meals per week 2.458 2.448 2.52 0.988 0.895
Always School Meal 0.436 0.436 0.439 0.995 0.971
Packed lunches per week 2.547 2.552 2.48 0.994 0.888
Always Packed Lunch 0.4 0.442 0.404 0.741 0.970
White British 0.903 0.905 0.78 0.973 0.202
Special dietary requirements 0.053 0.092 0.121 0.174 0.177
Specific health cond. 0.143 0.167 0.156 0.504 0.677
Normally eats breakfast 0.973 0.969 0.955 0.811 0.332
Less than 100% (less than 100% choice for independent variable characteristics)
Choice 0.546 0.501 0.478 0.465 0.369
Ate something 0.531 0.469 0.499 0.412 0.537
Ate more than half 0.399 0.415 0.413 0.791 0.851
School Dinner 0.445 0.355 0.539 0.566 0.533
Packed Lunch 0.527 0.625 0.446 0.536 0.583
Female 0.411 0.451 0.549 0.606 0.101
1st Language English 0.959 0.961 0.945 0.970 0.755
Free School Meal 0.151 0.1 0.164 0.590 0.841
School meals per week 2.233 1.451 2.847 0.255 0.387
Always School Meal 0.356 0.137 0.5 0.133 0.370
Packed lunches per week 2.781 3.549 2.153 0.258 0.373
Always Packed Lunch 0.384 0.51 0.361 0.552 0.883
White British 0.851 0.906 0.75 0.517 0.432
Special dietary requirements 0.027 0.098 0.181 0.101 0.031
Specific health cond. 0.178 0.22 0.125 0.642 0.423
Normally eats breakfast 0.959 0.94 0.931 0.682 0.445
notes: All variables are evaluated for the first week, before the start of the treatment. The first column shows
the means for the pupils in the control school in the, the second column for schools in the piece-rate scheme
and the third column in the competition schools. The fourth and fifth columns show the p-value difference in
the means of each treatment compared to the control group. The p-value were calculated, to account for intra-
school correlation, by regressing each baseline variable on one of the treatment indicators, and clustering the
standard errors at the school level, the p-value is matches to the t-statistic on the treatment dummy.
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Table 2: Average Treatment Effect: The effect of incentives on choosing a fruit or veg-
etable
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All < 100% in Week 1
Chooses Tries Eats > 1/2 Chooses Tries Eats > 1/2
Competition -0.022 0.032 0.11 -0.068 -0.032 0.014
(0.058) (0.065) (0.098) (0.074) (0.050) (0.072)
Piece rate -0.009 0.02 0.078 -0.045 -0.061 0.016
(0.075) (0.072) (0.072) (0.059) (0.073) (0.060)
Comp x Week 2 0.059* 0.085** 0.08 0.196*** 0.195*** 0.153
(0.031) (0.035) (0.081) (0.060) (0.037) (0.103)
Comp x Week 3 0.07 0.095** 0.083 0.155** 0.182*** 0.172*
(0.047) (0.045) (0.079) (0.077) (0.048) (0.090)
Comp x Week 4 0.025 0.073 0.083 0.109** 0.170*** 0.190**
(0.033) (0.048) (0.083) (0.049) (0.049) (0.088)
Comp x Week 5 0.041 0.075* 0.063 0.168*** 0.178*** 0.149*
(0.041) (0.044) (0.082) (0.062) (0.046) (0.084)
Piece x Week 2 0.071 0.0921 0.072 0.158*** 0.203** 0.143*
(0.047) (0.061) (0.068) (0.059) (0.091) (0.078)
Piece x Week 3 0.0797 0.102 0.0914 0.128 0.203** 0.166*
(0.058) (0.064) (0.074) (0.078) (0.092) (0.087)
Piece x Week 4 0.017 0.0294 0.0324 0.0789 0.119 0.109
(0.070) (0.074) (0.085) (0.105) (0.105) (0.095)
Piece x Week 5 0.0202 0.0526 0.0611 0.0422 0.136 0.123
(0.061) (0.075) (0.083) (0.097) (0.110) (0.092)
Constant 0.851*** 0.736*** 0.540*** 0.546*** 0.531*** 0.399***
-0.047 -0.038 -0.048 -0.046 -0.029 -0.028
N obs. 2,768 2,679 2,679 971 1,339 1,787
N pupils 626 609 609 203 304 410
notes: OLS regression results; including pupil random effects and with standard errors clustered at the school
level. Additional controls: week dummies. Dependent variable is the pupil weekly mean. *, ** and ***
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table 3: Dynamics of choice and consumption during the treatment weeks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Choice
Competition -0.097 -0.155** -0.184 -0.083 -0.106 0.088 0.045 -0.008
(0.079) (0.071) (0.149) (0.113) (0.123) (0.100) (0.087) (0.089)
Piece-Rate -0.031 0.011 0.074 -0.017 -0.050 -0.174*** 0.017 -0.144***
(0.063) (0.121) (0.160) (0.105) (0.089) (0.067) (0.102) (0.036)
Comp x Week 2-5 0.166*** 0.199*** 0.237* 0.179* 0.121 0.037 0.007 0.067
(0.059) (0.045) (0.131) (0.098) (0.100) (0.096) (0.065) (0.077)
Piece x Week 2-5 0.097 0.028 0.050 0.071 0.061 0.254** -0.061 0.176***
(0.079) (0.068) (0.131) (0.102) (0.125) (0.111) (0.183) (0.051)
Constant 0.520*** 0.499*** 0.604*** 0.618*** 0.612*** 0.440*** 0.347*** 0.607***
(0.041) (0.022) (0.140) (0.087) (0.026) (0.031) (0.074) (0.045)
Observations 4,743 910 977 951 975 930 841 1,970
Number of pupils 215 212 214 215 213 213 154 202
Panel B: Try
Competition -0.034 -0.010 -0.118* 0.018 -0.019 -0.042 0.016 0.002
(0.047) (0.098) (0.071) (0.081) (0.101) (0.100) (0.061) (0.059)
Piece-Rate -0.003 0.115 -0.050 0.013 -0.164 0.042 -0.049 -0.041
(0.060) (0.116) (0.098) (0.068) (0.105) (0.142) (0.113) (0.046)
Comp x Week 2-5 0.187*** 0.161* 0.268*** 0.159* 0.125 0.235*** 0.120** 0.126***
(0.033) (0.091) (0.076) (0.089) (0.089) (0.070) (0.053) (0.046)
Piece x Week 2-5 0.120 -0.022 0.160 0.109 0.250* 0.081 0.043 0.133**
(0.079) (0.101) (0.108) (0.076) (0.147) (0.131) (0.190) (0.062)
Constant 0.517*** 0.453*** 0.610*** 0.560*** 0.559*** 0.532*** 0.323*** 0.620***
(0.032) (0.082) (0.057) (0.049) (0.037) (0.076) (0.055) (0.040)
Observations 6,296 1,203 1,303 1,290 1,299 1,201 871 2,866
Number of pupils 333 315 328 318 315 315 175 305
Day of Week Mon-Fri Mon Tue Wed Thur Fri Wed-Fri Wed-Fri
Sample Used All All All All All All Missed Not Missed
Days of Week Controls Yes No No No No No Yes Yes
Week Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
notes: Robust Standard Errors clustered at the school level are in brackets; * sig at 10%, ** sig at 5%, *** sig at 1%. The sample
used in this regression are students who did not try at least some of a healthy option 100% of the time during the baseline week.
The ”Missed” sample in column [7] includes only those students who had not eaten any healthy times on Monday and Tuesday of
the given week. The ”Not Missed” sample in column [8] includes only those students who had eaten at least one healthy item on
Monday or Tuesday during the given week.
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Table 4a: Gender treatment effects (Boys) - All and Less than 100%
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All < 100% in Week 1
Chooses Tries Eats > half Chooses Tries Eats > half
Competition 0.001 0.08 0.102 -0.117 -0.029 -0.009
(0.078) (0.068) (0.093) (0.107) (0.058) (0.072)
Piece rate 0.013 0.017 0.042 -0.096 -0.069 -0.048
(0.093) (0.080) (0.075) (0.108) (0.086) (0.064)
Comp x Week 2 0.034 0.037 0.071 0.224*** 0.159*** 0.144*
(0.050) (0.050) (0.071) (0.079) (0.057) (0.082)
Comp x Week 3 0.054 0.046 0.0533 0.181* 0.135** 0.130*
(0.066) (0.048) (0.058) (0.096) (0.060) (0.072)
Comp x Week 4 -0.002 0.02 0.054 0.108* 0.154*** 0.167*
(0.045) (0.056) (0.083) (0.064) (0.055) (0.085)
Comp x Week 5 0.028 0.029 0.052 0.219*** 0.167** 0.114
(0.055) (0.060) (0.080) (0.083) (0.073) (0.088)
Piece x Week 2 0.07 0.149** 0.138* 0.209** 0.275*** 0.226***
(0.060) (0.071) (0.072) (0.090) (0.098) (0.083)
Piece x Week 3 0.084 0.153** 0.131* 0.188* 0.289*** 0.229***
(0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.101) (0.088) (0.073)
Piece x Week 4 -0.004 0.033 0.04 0.095 0.135 0.11
(0.078) (0.083) (0.085) (0.126) (0.099) (0.086)
Piece x Week 5 0.018 0.058 0.032 0.101 0.154 0.078
(0.067) (0.088) (0.080) (0.104) (0.117) (0.090)
Constant 0.818*** 0.711*** 0.544*** 0.548*** 0.532*** 0.419***
-0.063 -0.05 -0.047 -0.069 -0.044 -0.029
N obs. 1,302 1,236 1,236 496 660 850
N pupils 299 286 286 103 148 196
notes: see notes to table 2
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Table 4b: Gender treatment effects (Girls) - All and Less than 100%
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All < 100% in Week 1
Chooses Tries Eats > half Chooses Tries Eats > half
Competition -0.034 -0.006 0.117 -0.017 -0.033 0.038
(0.053) (0.073) (0.112) (0.078) (0.065) (0.083)
Piece rate -0.017 0.039 0.139 0.029 -0.054 0.109
(0.063) (0.079) (0.089) (0.065) (0.112) (0.077)
Comp x Week 2 0.078* 0.108*** 0.071 0.172** 0.188*** 0.135
(0.043) (0.041) (0.100) (0.079) (0.049) (0.133)
Comp x Week 3 0.078 0.120* 0.088 0.095 0.181** 0.178
(0.052) (0.064) (0.103) (0.093) (0.071) (0.121)
Comp x Week 4 0.036 0.103* 0.09 0.07 0.152*** 0.187*
(0.043) (0.053) (0.090) (0.060) (0.057) (0.099)
Comp x Week 5 0.038 0.096* 0.056 0.071 0.150** 0.159
(0.061) (0.054) (0.098) (0.106) (0.067) (0.111)
Piece x Week 2 0.067 0.031 -0.003 0.072 0.126 0.052
(0.045) (0.065) (0.076) (0.084) (0.125) (0.093)
Piece x Week 3 0.071 0.05 0.036 0.019 0.111 0.085
(0.056) (0.080) (0.095) (0.086) (0.157) (0.129)
Piece x Week 4 0.024 0.013 0.006 0.009 0.099 0.094
(0.065) (0.077) (0.100) (0.105) (0.146) (0.124)
Piece x Week 5 0.0088 0.032 0.064 -0.088 0.105 0.141
(0.064) (0.082) (0.102) (0.118) (0.144) (0.123)
Constant 0.883*** 0.760*** 0.541*** 0.542*** 0.528*** 0.384***
(0.039) (0.037) (0.063) (0.047) (0.033) (0.035)
N obs. 1,410 1,389 1,389 439 638 896
N pupils 315 311 311 92 147 205
notes: see notes to table 2
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Table 5a: Treatment effects (Year 2) - All and Less than 100%
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All < 100% in Week 1
Chooses Tries Eats > half Chooses Tries Eats > half
Competition -0.09 0.007 0.129 -0.169* -0.017 0.042
(0.060) (0.058) (0.108) (0.087) (0.071) (0.098)
Piece rate 0.014 0.065 0.144** -0.078 0.043 0.093
(0.056) (0.057) (0.071) (0.074) (0.077) (0.064)
Comp x Week 2 0.089** 0.085** 0.018 0.189** 0.156*** 0.076
(0.045) (0.040) (0.117) (0.080) (0.051) (0.167)
Comp x Week 3 0.067 0.065 0.046 0.129 0.091 0.13
(0.057) (0.050) (0.124) (0.093) (0.069) (0.159)
Comp x Week 4 0.014 0.041 0.064 0.034 0.064 0.156
(0.046) (0.046) (0.124) (0.084) (0.059) (0.145)
Comp x Week 5 0.076 0.101* 0.046 0.141 0.146** 0.103
(0.048) (0.052) (0.123) (0.088) (0.066) (0.147)
Piece x Week 2 -2.65E-06 -0.034 -0.087 -0.064 -0.070* -0.062
(0.033) (0.024) (0.056) (0.096) (0.042) (0.064)
Piece x Week 3 -0.009 -0.016 -0.032 -0.12 -0.057 -0.012
(0.036) (0.042) (0.073) (0.119) (0.058) (0.077)
Piece x Week 4 -0.115** -0.124** -0.116 -0.358** -0.208*** -0.111
(0.055) (0.059) (0.093) (0.151) (0.079) (0.093)
Piece x Week 5 -0.059 -0.078 -0.06 -0.271** -0.180* -0.067
(0.048) (0.061) (0.098) (0.130) (0.095) (0.101)
Constant 0.900*** 0.771*** 0.518*** 0.598*** 0.539*** 0.381***
(0.039) (0.038) (0.053) (0.051) (0.054) (0.036)
N obs. 1,439 1,426 1,426 416 643 949
N pupils 340 337 337 90 154 228
notes: see notes to table 2
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Table 5b: Treatment effects (Year 5) - All and Less than 100%
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All < 100% in Week 1
Chooses Tries Eats > half Chooses Tries Eats > half
Competition 0.055 0.054 0.096 0.039 -0.063 -0.014
(0.067) (0.103) (0.119) (0.073) (0.072) (0.073)
Piece rate -0.0276 -0.044 -0.001 -0.018 -0.158 -0.076
(0.104) (0.118) (0.119) (0.076) (0.107) (0.100)
Comp x Week 2 0.017 0.08 0.131* 0.176** 0.220*** 0.221***
(0.064) (0.066) (0.069) (0.069) (0.073) (0.070)
Comp x Week 3 0.072 0.127* 0.113 0.150* 0.268*** 0.207***
(0.064) (0.073) (0.075) (0.088) (0.058) (0.075)
Comp x Week 4 0.028 0.105 0.0959 0.147** 0.265*** 0.218**
(0.057) (0.079) (0.089) (0.071) (0.069) (0.096)
Comp x Week 5 -0.004 0.045 0.0743 0.173** 0.197*** 0.189**
(0.079) (0.071) (0.080) (0.077) (0.066) (0.078)
Piece x Week 2 0.139** 0.247*** 0.255*** 0.254*** 0.442*** 0.380***
(0.066) (0.095) (0.097) (0.058) (0.103) (0.102)
Piece x Week 3 0.169** 0.251** 0.244** 0.243** 0.432*** 0.382***
(0.083) (0.108) (0.117) (0.097) (0.120) (0.120)
Piece x Week 4 0.144* 0.219** 0.222** 0.267*** 0.403*** 0.378***
(0.087) (0.088) (0.099) (0.050) (0.080) (0.095)
Piece x Week 5 0.097 0.224*** 0.220** 0.176** 0.414*** 0.354***
(0.077) (0.085) (0.090) (0.078) (0.071) (0.088)
Constant 0.799*** 0.699*** 0.563*** 0.512*** 0.524*** 0.419***
(0.050) (0.042) (0.060) (0.056) (0.033) (0.045)
N obs. 1,324 1,248 1,248 555 691 833
N pupils 285 271 271 113 149 181
notes: see notes to table 2
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Table 6a: Treatment effects (Non-FSM) - All and Less than 100%
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All < 100% in Week 1
Chooses Tries Eats > half Chooses Tries Eats > half
Competition 0 0.071 0.13 -0.04 -0.012 0.031
(0.057) (0.062) (0.104) (0.079) (0.057) (0.079)
Piece rate -0.004 0.067 0.135* -0.013 -0.02 0.049
(0.079) (0.062) (0.075) (0.050) (0.059) (0.058)
Comp x Week 2 0.057* 0.063** 0.09 0.193*** 0.189*** 0.158
(0.034) (0.031) (0.077) (0.054) (0.031) (0.098)
Comp x Week 3 0.066 0.062 0.067 0.129* 0.143** 0.152
(0.051) (0.046) (0.083) (0.078) (0.060) (0.093)
Comp x Week 4 0.023 0.048 0.074 0.090* 0.143*** 0.167*
(0.034) (0.047) (0.086) (0.055) (0.053) (0.093)
Comp x Week 5 0.035 0.051 0.066 0.157** 0.158*** 0.136
(0.042) (0.042) (0.079) (0.066) (0.048) (0.084)
Piece x Week 2 0.075 0.082 0.058 0.138** 0.220*** 0.145**
(0.055) (0.055) (0.064) (0.069) (0.079) (0.074)
Piece x Week 3 0.09 0.081 0.066 0.116 0.174** 0.151*
(0.064) (0.054) (0.070) (0.079) (0.081) (0.084)
Piece x Week 4 0.028 0.012 0.022 0.083 0.0881 0.103
(0.077) (0.068) (0.083) (0.095) (0.098) (0.095)
Piece x Week 5 0.026 0.044 0.044 0.038 0.113 0.108
(0.066) (0.069) (0.079) (0.085) (0.109) (0.089)
Constant 0.837*** 0.710*** 0.528*** 0.533*** 0.514*** 0.391***
(0.045) (0.036) (0.056) (0.051) (0.028) (0.034)
N obs. 2,206 2,149 2,149 796 1,059 1,397
N pupils 498 487 487 168 242 322
notes: see notes to table 2
39
Table 6b: Treatment effects (FSM) - All and Less than 100%
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All < 100% in Week 1
Chooses Tries Eats > half Chooses Tries Eats > half
Competition -0.112 -0.124 0.03 -0.204 -0.123 -0.033
(0.097) (0.106) (0.133) (0.151) (0.102) (0.099)
Piece rate -0.005 -0.135 -0.096 -0.245* -0.295* -0.049
(0.099) (0.156) (0.142) (0.130) (0.151) (0.132)
Comp x Week 2 0.106 0.201** 0.056 0.277* 0.193* 0.117
(0.066) (0.086) (0.113) (0.165) (0.109) (0.160)
Comp x Week 3 0.101 0.231*** 0.145* 0.313** 0.337*** 0.235**
(0.064) (0.074) (0.084) (0.146) (0.125) (0.118)
Comp x Week 4 0.055 0.193*** 0.142 0.207 0.262*** 0.279**
(0.069) (0.071) (0.101) (0.135) (0.067) (0.113)
Comp x Week 5 0.065 0.184*** 0.056 0.204 0.233*** 0.19
(0.061) (0.068) (0.107) (0.131) (0.089) (0.129)
Piece x Week 2 0.052 0.163 0.153 0.293* 0.252 0.182
(0.051) (0.136) (0.120) (0.175) (0.201) (0.117)
Piece x Week 3 0.02 0.199 0.182 0.119 0.432** 0.224
(0.039) (0.136) (0.134) (0.110) (0.213) (0.142)
Piece x Week 4 -0.051 0.083 0.066 -0.118 0.292 0.141
(0.061) (0.157) (0.163) (0.206) (0.241) (0.176)
Piece x Week 5 -0.046 0.058 0.085 -0.0979 0.236 0.136
(0.069) (0.154) (0.149) (0.346) (0.234) (0.161)
Constant 0.903*** 0.829*** 0.588*** 0.595*** 0.608*** 0.426***
(0.071) (0.072) (0.094) (0.129) (0.069) (0.067)
N obs. 487 462 462 140 230 335
N pupils 113 108 108 28 52 77
notes: see notes to table 2
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Table 7: Medium run effects (i.e. including week 6) by Gender
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All < 100% in Week 1
Chooses Tries Eats > half Chooses Tries Eats > half
Panel A: Boys
Competition 0.001 0.08 0.08 -0.117 -0.029 0.02
(0.077) (0.067) (0.067) (0.106) (0.057) (0.072)
Piece rate 0.013 0.017 0.017 -0.096 -0.069 -0.045
(0.093) (0.080) (0.080) (0.107) (0.086) (0.098)
Comp x Wk2-5 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.185** 0.154*** 0.084
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.072) (0.054) (0.059)
Comp x Week 6 -0.04 0.003 0.003 0.047 0.135* 0.043
(0.032) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.079) (0.075)
Piece x Wk2-5 0.041 0.098 0.098 0.149* 0.213** 0.161*
(0.063) (0.073) (0.073) (0.086) (0.091) (0.091)
Piece x Week 6 -0.062 0.033 0.033 -0.054 0.118 0.073
(0.062) (0.078) (0.078) (0.115) (0.102) (0.099)
N obs. 1,565 1,490 1,490 597 794 1,025
N pupils 299 286 286 103 148 196
Panel B: Girls
Competition -0.034 -0.006 -0.006 -0.017 -0.033 -0.094
(0.052) (0.073) (0.073) (0.077) (0.064) (0.072)
Piece rate -0.017 0.039 0.039 0.029 -0.054 0.004
(0.063) (0.079) (0.079) (0.064) (0.111) (0.103)
Comp x Wk2-5 0.06 0.109** 0.109** 0.106 0.170*** 0.202***
(0.045) (0.047) (0.047) (0.076) (0.048) (0.053)
Comp x Week 6 0.033 0.077 0.077 0.056 0.108* 0.158***
(0.055) (0.048) (0.048) (0.068) (0.062) (0.047)
Piece x Wk2-5 0.043 0.032 0.032 0.004 0.11 0.075
(0.053) (0.072) (0.072) (0.087) (0.135) (0.103)
Piece x Week 6 -0.009 0.007 0.007 -0.095 0.07 0.043
(0.067) (0.090) (0.090) (0.098) (0.176) (0.127)
N obs. 1,698 1,675 1,675 531 769 1,079
N pupils 315 311 311 92 147 205
notes:
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Table 8: Medium run effects (i.e. including week 6) by Year Group
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All < 100% in Week 1
Chooses Tries Eats > half Chooses Tries Eats > half
Panel A: Year 2
Competition -0.089 0.007 0.007 -0.169** -0.017 -0.069
(0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.086) (0.071) (0.063)
Piece rate 0.014 0.064 0.064 -0.078 0.043 0.039
(0.055) (0.057) (0.057) (0.073) (0.076) (0.078)
Comp x Wk2-5 0.063 0.071* 0.071* 0.127 0.113** 0.138***
(0.045) (0.040) (0.040) (0.080) (0.052) (0.043)
Comp x Week 6 0.046 0.071* 0.071* 0.067 0.144** 0.146***
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.067) (0.061) (0.050)
Piece x Wk2-5 -0.046 -0.063* -0.063* -0.202*** -0.129*** -0.069**
(0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.073) (0.045) (0.035)
Piece x Week 6 -0.107** -0.097** -0.097** -0.439*** -0.162** -0.107**
(0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.075) (0.078) (0.047)
N obs. 1,743 1,727 1,727 505 779 1,151
N pupils 340 337 337 90 154 228
Panel B: Year 5
Competition 0.055 0.054 0.054 0.039 -0.063 -0.031
(0.067) (0.102) (0.102) (0.073) (0.072) (0.107)
Piece rate -0.028 -0.044 -0.044 -0.018 -0.158 -0.118
(0.104) (0.118) (0.118) (0.075) (0.107) (0.135)
Comp x Wk2-5 0.028 0.09 0.09 0.162** 0.238*** 0.186**
(0.060) (0.067) (0.067) (0.064) (0.054) (0.082)
Comp x Week 6 -0.044 0.03 0.03 0.061 0.134 0.087
(0.073) (0.079) (0.079) (0.071) (0.082) (0.090)
Piece x Wk2-5 0.137* 0.235*** 0.235*** 0.236*** 0.423*** 0.356***
(0.074) (0.090) (0.090) (0.061) (0.085) (0.106)
Piece x Week 6 0.055 0.190* 0.190* 0.120* 0.336*** 0.284**
(0.084) (0.108) (0.108) (0.071) (0.109) (0.124)
N obs. 1,582 1,498 1,498 667 828 997
N pupils 285 271 271 113 149 181
notes:
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Table 9: Medium run effects (i.e. including week 6) by Free School Meal Status
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
All < 100% in Week 1
Chooses Tries Eats > half Chooses Tries Eats > half
Panel A: Non-FSM
Competition 0 0.071 0.071 -0.039 -0.012 0.003
(0.057) (0.062) (0.062) (0.079) (0.056) (0.064)
Piece rate -0.003 0.067 0.067 -0.013 -0.02 0.003
(0.078) (0.062) (0.062) (0.060) (0.059) (0.075)
Comp x Wk2-5 0.048 0.056 0.056 0.148*** 0.161*** 0.122***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.054) (0.036) (0.045)
Comp x Week 6 0.005 0.025 0.025 0.068 0.112** 0.073*
(0.038) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.056) (0.044)
Piece x Wk2-5 0.054 0.055 0.055 0.094 0.149* 0.119
(0.061) (0.056) (0.056) (0.067) (0.082) (0.077)
Piece x Week 6 -0.009 0.024 0.024 -0.029 0.085 0.069
(0.067) (0.065) (0.065) (0.089) (0.104) (0.089)
N obs. 2,661 2,597 2,597 962 1,277 1,687
N pupils 498 487 487 168 242 322
Panel B: FSM
Competition -0.112 -0.124 -0.124 -0.204 -0.123 -0.230*
(0.096) (0.105) (0.105) (0.147) (0.100) (0.119)
Piece rate -0.005 -0.135 -0.135 -0.245* -0.295** -0.137
(0.099) (0.155) (0.155) (0.126) (0.149) (0.178)
Comp x Wk2-5 0.081 0.202*** 0.202*** 0.250* 0.255*** 0.310***
(0.061) (0.070) (0.070) (0.132) (0.089) (0.087)
Comp x Week 6 0.018 0.174** 0.174** 0.086 0.226** 0.295***
(0.091) (0.084) (0.084) (0.159) (0.106) (0.105)
Piece x Wk2-5 -0.005 0.126 0.126 0.049 0.304 0.158
(0.046) (0.138) (0.138) (0.199) (0.211) (0.160)
Piece x Week 6 -0.14 0.024 0.024 -0.314 0.192 0.061
(0.107) (0.167) (0.167) (0.371) (0.247) (0.186)
N obs. 581 552 552 168 276 401
N pupils 113 108 108 28 52 77
notes:
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Table 10: Habit Formation (IV Estimation)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Try Eats more than half
Week 6 6 months later Week 6 6 months later
All < 100% All < 100% All < 100% All < 100%
All sample 0.646** 0.637** 0.085 -0.056 0.976*** 0.887*** 0.1 0.095
(0.262) (0.268) (0.525) (0.546) (0.219) (0.221) (0.460) (0.398)
1st stage F-stat 10.22 12.08 7.892 5.623 5.11 5.6 4.986 6.196
Boys 0.494* 0.610*** -0.092 -0.065 0.810*** 0.594*** 0.484 0.559
[0.281] [0.225] [0.795] [0.576] [0.192] [0.207] [0.671] [0.416]
1st stage F-stat 3.845 4.987 2.183 3.464 5.188 6.164 1.87 4.093
Girls 0.689** 0.619* 0.028 -0.125 0.990*** 1.037*** -0.228 -0.248
[0.295] [0.353] [0.401] [0.602] [0.288] [0.304] [0.477] [0.402]
1st stage F-stat 8.239 6.436 7.387 3.849 3.522 3.642 5.881 4.569
Year 2 1.354*** 1.358*** 1.369 1.572* 1.427*** 1.452*** 0.583 1.947*
[0.295] [0.249] [1.213] [0.926] [0.345] [0.406] [0.689] [1.140]
1st stage F-stat 2.988 4.531 0.588 0.222 1.139 1.045 0.742 0.813
Year 5 0.723*** 0.705*** -0.044 -0.13 0.732*** 0.696*** 0.144 -0.044
[0.197] [0.149] [0.555] [0.478] [0.216] [0.206] [0.438] [0.367]
1st stage F-stat 26.19 34.48 19.09 27.19 14.71 17.82 8.748 15.01
No FSM 0.654** 0.609** -0.232 -0.212 0.923*** 0.822*** -0.135 -0.21
[0.289] [0.306] [0.579] [0.655] [0.261] [0.265] [0.509] [0.446]
1st stage F-stat 6.46 8.813 4.621 3.33 5.377 5.193 3.942 3.798
FSM 0.960** 0.748 0.959 0.324 1.352*** 1.179*** 0.471 0.868***
[0.474] [0.486] [0.604] [0.479] [0.457] [0.341] [0.539] [0.250]
1st stage F-stat 3.421 3.919 4.714 5.019 1.121 3.055 3.643 9.227
notes: Second-stage IV estimates, standard errors clustered at the school level. The dependent variable is the
mean consumption in week 6 or week 7; the coefficient corresponds to the effect of the mean consumption
during the intervention (weeks 2 to 5) using the treatment (competition or piece rate) as an instrument. *,
** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table 11: Food knowledge & Spot the difference tests - difference across treatment and
control groups - OLS estimates (Tried less than 100% in the first sample)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
All Boys Girls Year 2 Year 5 FSM No FSM
Panel A: Food Knowledge test 2
Competition -0.032 -0.002 -0.057 -0.082 0.011 -0.095 -0.017
[0.029] [0.050] [0.040] [0.053] [0.034] [0.078] [0.034]
Piece rate 0.019 0.062 -0.039 -0.033 0.057 -0.118 0.045
[0.033] [0.049] [0.074] [0.078] [0.051] [0.244] [0.038]
Test 1 -0.017 -0.077 0.065 -0.048 0.013 0.284 -0.1
[0.083] [0.107] [0.134] [0.126] [0.119] [0.196] [0.090]
Constant 0.910*** 0.936*** 0.864*** 0.890*** 0.852*** 0.709*** 0.960***
[0.067] [0.093] [0.120] [0.112] [0.092] [0.159] [0.082]
Observations 142 66 75 64 77 21 120
R-squared 0.072 0.094 0.082 0.046 0.03 0.259 0.074
Panel B: Spot the difference test 2 score
Competition -0.048 -0.085* -0.017 0.009 -0.061 0.022 -0.062
[0.035] [0.047] [0.054] [0.048] [0.050] [0.086] [0.039]
Piece rate 0.076* 0.088 0.065 0.088 0.093 0.182 0.066
[0.043] [0.056] [0.070] [0.065] [0.058] [0.116] [0.047]
Test 1 0.733*** 0.782*** 0.691*** 0.901*** 0.618*** 0.751*** 0.718***
[0.060] [0.080] [0.092] [0.087] [0.092] [0.142] [0.068]
Constant 0.302*** 0.296*** 0.344*** 0.138*** 0.374*** 0.229 0.306***
[0.053] [0.072] [0.068] [0.048] [0.071] [0.160] [0.058]
Observations 202 103 99 103 99 32 170
R-squared 0.599 0.646 0.565 0.534 0.38 0.709 0.572
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Appendix A: Experimental Materials
Figure A1: Stickers and rewards
Appendix B: Additional Tables (not for publication)
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Table B1: Additional summary statistics
Control Piece Rate Comp p-value p-value
(C) (T1) (T2) C vs T1 C vs T2
Panel A: Tried less than 100% in the baseline week
School Dinner 0.441 0.573 0.469 0.369 0.811
Packed Lunch 0.54 0.418 0.493 0.414 0.694
Female 0.476 0.394 0.592 0.214 0.057
1st Language English 0.969 0.97 0.913 0.969 0.285
Free School Meal 0.159 0.188 0.192 0.698 0.492
School meals per week 2.198 2.727 2.495 0.452 0.627
Always School Meal 0.365 0.485 0.426 0.469 0.672
Packed lunches per week 2.81 2.273 2.505 0.443 0.616
Always Packed Lunch 0.429 0.379 0.426 0.718 0.982
White British 0.906 0.899 0.741 0.907 0.122
Special dietary requirements 0.04 0.108 0.146 0.084 0.043
Specific health cond. 0.184 0.215 0.165 0.585 0.618
Normally eats breakfast 0.968 0.938 0.932 0.300 0.206
Panel B: Eats more half less than 100% in the baseline week
School Dinner 0.509 0.581 0.464 0.527 0.656
Packed Lunch 0.466 0.411 0.504 0.629 0.719
Female 0.512 0.453 0.552 0.291 0.467
1st Language English 0.977 0.979 0.91 0.927 0.125
Free School Meal 0.193 0.237 0.163 0.490 0.543
School meals per week 2.43 2.926 2.515 0.408 0.874
Always School Meal 0.419 0.526 0.432 0.446 0.917
Packed lunches per week 2.576 2.074 2.485 0.402 0.865
Always Packed Lunch 0.39 0.347 0.402 0.731 0.914
White British 0.89 0.918 0.734 0.662 0.148
Special dietary requirements 0.047 0.074 0.119 0.331 0.084
Specific health cond. 0.171 0.202 0.157 0.478 0.669
Normally eats breakfast 0.97 0.947 0.933 0.285 0.168
notes: see notes to Table 1
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Table B2: Summary statistics - Food knowledge test - Correct answers
Test 1 Test 2
All N Mean SD N Mean SD
What is it 460 0.922 0.14 414 0.92 0.146
Is it healthy 462 0.827 0.177 409 0.854 0.157
Boys
What is it 219 0.911 0.155 189 0.915 0.154
Is it healthy 221 0.805 0.19 186 0.838 0.165
Girls
What is it 235 0.933 0.124 217 0.93 0.135
Is it healthy 234 0.85 0.158 215 0.869 0.149
Year 2
What is it 244 0.9 0.152 233 0.898 0.159
Is it healthy 245 0.802 0.193 227 0.834 0.17
Year 5
What is it 216 0.947 0.12 181 0.95 0.12
Is it healthy 217 0.855 0.154 182 0.878 0.136
FSM
What is it 73 0.902 0.131 69 0.907 0.139
Is it healthy 75 0.765 0.197 67 0.826 0.181
No FSM
What is it 377 0.926 0.142 336 0.926 0.145
Is it healthy 376 0.841 0.168 333 0.859 0.152
Table B3: Summary statistics - Spot the differences test - Correct answers
Test 1 Test 2
N Mean SD N Mean SD
All 545 0.393 0.326 494 0.52 0.367
Boys 262 0.386 0.324 230 0.494 0.375
Girls 274 0.404 0.327 255 0.546 0.357
Year 2 294 0.241 0.276 273 0.364 0.333
Year 5 251 0.57 0.288 221 0.712 0.313
FSM 94 0.378 0.35 81 0.437 0.375
No FSM 440 0.394 0.319 402 0.537 0.363
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Table B4: Food knowledge & Spot the difference tests - difference across treatment and
control groups - OLS estimates (All pupils)
All Boys Girls Year 2 Year 5 FSM No FSM
Panel A: Food Knowledge test 2
Competition -0.008 0.002 -0.013 -0.039 0.036 -0.068 0.008
[0.023] [0.032] [0.026] [0.029] [0.028] [0.047] [0.022]
Piece rate -0.001 0.018 -0.019 -0.015 0.027 -0.043 0.017
[0.022] [0.038] [0.042] [0.041] [0.041] [0.104] [0.029]
Test 1 0.077 0.056 0.072 0.05 0.108 0.215 0.026
[0.055] [0.078] [0.082] [0.074] [0.093] [0.132] [0.060]
Constant 0.815*** 0.823*** 0.829*** 0.809*** 0.752*** 0.702*** 0.843***
[0.043] [0.069] [0.077] [0.062] [0.079] [0.105] [0.056]
Observations 292 136 155 160 132 45 247
R-squared 0.032 0.063 0.028 0.024 0.031 0.16 0.017
Panel B: Spot the differences test 2
Competition -0.007 -0.004 -0.008 0.01 0.013 0.046 -0.019
[0.028] [0.042] [0.038] [0.038] [0.045] [0.076] [0.030]
Piece rate 0.022 0.051 -0.003 0.021 0.049 0.092 0.007
[0.033] [0.045] [0.049] [0.043] [0.052] [0.073] [0.037]
Test 1 0.740*** 0.805*** 0.693*** 0.823*** 0.641*** 0.704*** 0.749***
[0.040] [0.057] [0.055] [0.053] [0.067] [0.089] [0.045]
Constant 0.297*** 0.267*** 0.338*** 0.170*** 0.352*** 0.208** 0.304***
[0.040] [0.056] [0.053] [0.038] [0.053] [0.100] [0.044]
Observations 423 202 221 234 189 68 355
R-squared 0.546 0.572 0.525 0.479 0.353 0.547 0.544
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Figure A2: Example food knowledge test
Figure A3: Example Spot the difference test
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